Modern operating systems increasingly rely on enforcing mandatory access control through the use of security policies. Given the critical property of policy correctness in such systems, formal methods and models are applied for both specification and verification of these policies. Due to the heterogeneity of their respective semantics, this is an intricate and error-prone engineering process. However, diverse access control systems on the one hand and diverse formal criteria of correctness on the other hand have so far impeded a unifying framework for this task.
INTRODUCTION
In order to meet tightening security requirements in most modern application areas, IT systems increasingly rely on formally specified security policies (Watson, 2013) . These policies define rules that, reliably enforced by a system's implementation, can be proven to achieve application-specific formal properties concerning security goals such as confidentiality and integrity of a system and the information it processes. A major field of application for such security policies is the operating systems domain, which yielded an increasing number policy-controlled operating systems over the past years (Spencer et al., 1999; Loscocco and Smalley, 2001; Watson and Vance, 2003; Smalley and Craig, 2013; Russello et al., 2012; Bugiel et al., 2013; Faden, 2007; Grimes and Johansson, 2007) .
While new methods emerged for design, implementation and enforcement of OS security policies, their specification and verification also received increasing attention. Formal models have been developed for such policies based on two major objectives: (1) To precisely specify the semantics of a particular system, which are determined by its respective application domain (such as roles (Sandhu et al., 2000) or user relationships (Fong and Siahaan, 2011) ); (2) to formalize and subsequently analyze a security property, which results from the security requirements of a particular application domain (such as right proliferation (Harrison et al., 1976; Ferrara et al., 2013) or information flows (Kafura and Gracanin, 2013) ). Both approaches yield models that are available to formal methods; however, models resulting from both approaches are often incompatible: when focusing on a formally analyzable property such as dynamic right proliferation, system-independent access control models based on state machines have proven to be valuable; when focusing on a formal framework for policy specification and communication on the other hand, system-specific models such as for the SELinux operating system have evolved, which may in turn sacrifice analyzability with respect to a whole family of security properties.
This problem has been addressed by the design paradigm of model-based security policy engineering (Barker, 2009; Kühnhauser and Pölck, 2011; Kafura and Gracanin, 2013; Amthor et al., 2014; Pölck, 2014) . Its goal is to derive a uniform pattern for designing security models, which flexibly fits (1) diverse security policy semantics as well as (2) diverse formal analysis goals. Such a uniform pattern would then serve as a fundamental prerequisite for both specifying and verifying security policies.
According to Amthor et al. (2014) ; Pölck (2014) , this goal can be achieved through a flexible and extensible common model core based on a deterministic state machine (core-based model engineering). In practice, it requires to adapt domain-specific abstractions to a deliberately general formal framework. This yields a twofold result: On the one hand, corebased model engineering eliminates the need for a formal approach from scratch, whenever a given security policy is to be analyzed with one of the two objectives stated above. On the other hand, given the versatile and thus domain-independent semantics of the pattern, the actual engineering effort to create usable model instances is still significant in practice (as pointed out by Pölck (2014, pp. 46 et seq.) ).
This paper aims at further reducing this engineering effort-and thus the probability of errorsin the domain of policy-controlled operating systems by presenting a refinement of the core-based modeling pattern. Its idea is based on the general principle of entity labeling, which can be found in a large family of access control (AC) policies for contemporary operating systems. The resulting modeling pattern will then be applied to the SELinux operating system, which exhibits semantic features typical for OS security policies. Based on the resulting SELinux access control model, we will discuss the costs of model design and model instantiation.
Contributions and Paper Organization. To introduce the context of this paper, we briefly discuss relevant related work (Sec. 2), followed by a summary of the fundamental concepts of one typical representative, SELinux (Sec. 3). Sec. 4 focuses on a formalization of the discussed concepts: First, the fundamentals of core-based modeling are introduced (Sec. 4.1). We then present a novel, abstract policy modeling pattern based on entity labeling (Sec. 4.2), which enriches the core pattern by adequate access control semantics for the operating systems domain. It hence eases analysis and verification of contemporary operating system security policies with respect to an actual system's protection state (dynamic analysis) using existing formal methods and tools.
To substantiate this claim, we applied our pattern to SELinux. We create an entity labeling model of the SELinux access control system (Sec. 5) and discuss, how a real-world system's protection state and security policy can be transformed into an instance of this model (Sec. 6). This paves the way for subsequently applying tried and tested analysis methods for core-based models to SELinux. We conclude with Section 7.
RELATED WORK
In the AC model community, considerable research has already been done to unify model semantics and formalisms. Notably, the access control metamodel by Barker (2009) , the Policy Machine (Ferraiolo et al., 2011) , and core-based security models Pölck, 2014) provide general formal frameworks for a precise specification of access control semantics and policies. While Barker's unifying meta-model and the Policy Machine are primarily designed for policy specification, core-based modeling aims at both specifying and analyzing/verifying a policy.
Another family of formal AC models is specifically tailored to OSs. Among numerous work in this area, most is tailored to specific operating systems such as SELinux (Sarna-Starosta and Stoller, 2004; Zanin and Mancini, 2004; Xu et al., 2013) or special types of OS policies such as MLS (Naldurg and Raghavendra, 2011) . While all of these approaches emphasize policy analysis with respect to a particular formal security property, they cannot be easily adapted to other OS AC semantics or other formal analysis goals. In our approach, we aim for both: streamlined adaption to versatile OS AC semantics that share only the abstract concept of labeling, and accessibility to a bandwidth of security properties and their appropriate formal analysis methods.
The basic idea of label-based AC modeling is far from being new. Dating back to the historical BLP model (Bell and LaPadula, 1976) , which effectively introduced access permissions based on labels, a whole new class of attribute-based AC models (ABAC) evolved based on this principle (Zhang et al., 2005; Kuhn et al., 2010) . However, they usually focus policy specification in the domain of service-oriented architectures (Yuan and Tong, 2005; Shen, 2009; Park and Chung, 2014) rather than system architectures. To this end, both the goal of formal policy analysis and the focus on the OS domain cannot be easily incorporated into existing ABAC models.
SELinux ACCESS CONTROL
Today's operating systems increasingly rely on mandatory access control (MAC) mechanisms governed by a security policy. In large parts, their authorization semantics are based on assigning policyspecific labels to entities, which are divided into subjects (an activity abstraction such as process or thread) and objects (OS resources, described by abstractions such as files, handlers, sockets, etc.). The idea of label-based OS policies dates back to SELinux ( Loscocco and Smalley, 2001) , one of the first policycontrolled OSs, and has been adopted by a wide range of later operating systems such as SEBSD (Watson and Vance, 2003) , Oracle Solaris (Faden, 2007) , Microsoft Windows (Grimes and Johansson, 2007) , and Google's Android (Smalley and Craig, 2013) .
The goal of this section is to take a closer look at the security architecture and policy semantics of SELinux as a typical representative of modern policycontrolled operating systems.
Security Architecture
The original goal of SELinux was to enforce MAC in the Linux operating system. To achieve this, the Flask security architecture (Spencer et al., 1999 ) was implemented, which clearly distinguished between policy enforcement points (PEP) and a singular policy decision point (PDP). The PDP logically encapsulates the whole security policy.
Today, SELinux is implemented as a dynamically loadable kernel module. Its architecture merges into the Linux kernel through the LSM interface (Linux Security Modules). It provides ready-made PEP hooks for all system call implementations, which are connected to the PDP (the security server) via the SELinux kernel module. In addition to the processing logic, that translates information about an OS resource access into the policy-related data structures that are used by the security server, this module also includes a caching mechanism for previously made decisions (the access vector cache, AVC).
To illustrate how an access request by an application process (1) is handled in SELinux, we consider the following example based on Linux kernel 3.19 (cf. Fig. 1 ): Once an according syscall is processed by the kernel, e.g. read() for accessing a file (2), the LSM hook (security file permission()) invokes the according interface of the SELinux Security Module (3).
Here, the permissions needed for authorizing the specific request (here: FILE READ) are checked against the AVC (calling avc has perm()) or, in case of a miss, the security server's security compute av()-interface (4). The decision is then returned through the LSM hook and enforced by the read()-implementation in vfs read() (either invoking the respective file system interface to ultimately access the storage hardware (5), or returning to the caller with an "access denied" error).
Inside the security server logic, access decisions are based on the policy rules and SELinux security contexts associated to entities. The latter is a label consisting of four attributes, which is usually represented by a string user : role : type [: range] where user is the name of an SELinux user the process belongs to, role is the name of an SELinux role the process assumes, and type is the name of the domain (or type) in SELinux type enforcement (TE) in which the process currently runs. Finally, range is a collection of confidentiality classes and categories used by multi-level security (MLS) policy rules based on the BLP model. Since support for the MLS mechanism is neither required by the SELinux policy semantics nor by the security server, this fourth attribute is optional. We will discuss the semantics of these attributes in a security policy in the next section.
Technically, security contexts of processes are stored in their management data structures, represented as a part of the non-persistent /proc file system, while those of objects such as files or sockets are stored in extended attributes of the respective file system.
Policy Semantics
As already mentioned, the PDP logic in SELinux is configured by a security policy. At runtime, a binary representation of this policy resides in kernel address space; however, as for the rest of this paper, we will refer to its human-readable specification in SELinux policy language (Smalley, 2005) as "the (security) policy".
An SELinux security policy consists of statements, which can be classified into different types of rules. Each rule basically supports one of three fundamental AC concepts supported by SELinux: type enforcement (TE), role-based access control (RBAC), and multi-level security (MLS). The most basic authorization mechanism is implemented through TE, using TE-allow-rules which basically associate a pair of types with a set of permissions: The rule allow system_t etc_t : file {read execute} for example will grant any process labeled with the system t type the right to read and execute any file-class object labeled with etc t.
We call system t, etc t, file the key of above TEallow-rule. A second authorization mechanism, whose support by an SELinux kernel is still optional, is MLS. Its rules are based on defining a dominance relation over the attributes confidentiality class and category, which is then used to limit all read-or write access to particular objects.
Lastly, the RBAC mechanism is used for limiting attribute changes of a process.
Since all attributes are changeable except for the user, this provides a policy administrator with an additional, user-centric layer of AC configuration. RBAC rules define compatible combinations of all three major attributes: The role declaration rule role user_r types { user_t passwd_t } is necessary to label any process with the user r role with both types user t and passwd t. Similarly, any role can be tied to one or more users by the user declaration rule: user peter roles { admin_r } is necessary to label any process with user attribute peter with the admin r role.
As mentioned before, the type-and role-attribute of a security context may change during runtime (known as transitions). Accordingly, there are policy rules to control these changes: For role transitions, a role-allow-rule allow user_r admin_r is necessary to change the role-attribute user r of a process to admin r. Note that, despite of the same keyword, this rule has nothing to do with access authorization through TE.
For type transitions on the other hand, a special set of SELinux permissions exists that must be assigned to types through the already discussed TEallow-rules. Rules with these permissions can be used for fine-grained control over allowed, forbidden, or even mandatory type transitions; however, it should be noted that their semantics are entirely different to those intended for object access:
• allow init t apache t : process transition is necessary for a process to change its type from init t to apache t.
• allow apache t apache exec t : file entrypoint is necessary for a process to change its type to apache t during execution of a program file of type apache exec t.
• allow init t apache exec t : file execute no trans is necessary for a process with type init t to execute a program file of type apache exec t without a type transition.
Since type transitions are intended to exclusively happen on program execution, the regular permission execute on apache exec t : file will also be necessary in each case. As a last rule type, SELinux policies support constraints, that may further restrict (i.e. override) any access decision based on the mechanisms discussed so far. Supported by a limited syntax for nested boolean expressions, constraints can be used to explicitly forbid an access based on the security contexts of both involved entities and the given logical expression.
MODELING PATTERNS
This section introduces the two basic formal approaches we will use to model the SELinux AC system: the core-based modeling pattern by Pölck, and the novel EL pattern which aims at simplifying a domain-specific model engineering for OS AC policies. Throughout the rest of this paper, we will use the following conventions for formal notation:
|= is a binary relation between variable assignments and formulas in second-order logic, where I |= φ iff I is an assignment of unbound variables to values that satisfies φ. In an unambiguous context, we will write x 0 , . . . , x n |= φ for any assignment of variables x i in φ that satisfies φ.
For any mapping f , f [x → y] denotes the mapping which maps x to y and any other argument x to f (x ). For any mapping f : A → B, f A denotes a restriction of f to A ⊂ A that maps any argument x ∈ A to f (x ), whereas f A (x) is undefined for any x ∈ A \ A .
For any set A, 2 A denotes the power set of A. B = { , ⊥} is the set of Boolean values, where (true) is interpreted as "allow", ⊥ (false) as "deny".
Core-based Modeling
The goal of the core-based model engineering paradigm is to establish a uniform formal basis for specification, analysis and implementation of diverse security models. In this work, we build our modeling pattern on top of this paradigm to leverage its generality regarding formal analysis methods and its uniform yet flexible design.
A core-based access control model is described by an extended state machine
where Q is a (finite or infinite) set of protection states, Σ is a (finite or infinite) set of inputs, δ : Q × Σ → Q is the state transition function, λ : Q × Σ → B is the output function, q 0 ∈ Q is the initial protection state, and EXT is an arbitrary tuple of static model extensions.
The state machine serves as a common basis for formalizing policy semantics, called model core, which can be tailored to any domain-specific security policy in terms of state members and model extensions. Based on the abstract definition above, three steps are required to describe a particular AC system through a core-based model (cf. Pölck, 2014, pp. 25 et seq.): (1.) Specializing Q, i.e. explicitly defining the automaton's state space members (dynamic model components). (2.) Specializing EXT, i.e. defining static model components which are not part of the automaton's state. (3.) Specializing δ and λ, i.e. describing the dynamic behavior of the AC system. Depending on step (1), the initial protection state q 0 has to be specified according to the particular analysis goal. Depending on both steps (1) and (2), the input alphabet Σ has to be specified according to the interface of the modeled access control system.
In step (3), protection state dynamics are described by the state transition function δ through preand post-conditions of every possible state transition. This is done by comparing each input with two formulas in second-order logic, PRE and POST. We then define δ by formally specifying the conditions that each pair of states q and q has to satisfy w.r.t. an input σ ∈ Σ for a state transition from q to q to occur:
(2) Since an access control system is usually deterministic, POST fundamentally requires that q equals q where not redefined.
Finally, to describe authorization decisions at an AC system's interface, the automaton features an output function λ. It enables the analysis of correct policy behavior and thus supports a formally verified specification. λ defines a binary access decision based on PRE: λ(q, σ) ⇔ q, σ |= PRE.
Entity Labeling
This section describes entity labeling (EL), an abstract semantic modeling pattern for the formalization of contemporary operating system security policies. Based on the observations on OS policy semantics discussed in Section 3, the design goal of an entity labeling model is to describe access control policies which 1. use attributes (labels) of system entities for access decisions 2. have a dynamic protection state 3. are governed by additional constraints, possibly subject to a dynamically changing context
The domain-specific semantics of such models is directly derived from these goals: (1.) To support labeling, a basic set of possible label values is needed. Since our goal is a complete description of an access control system, a set of entity identifiers is needed as well as an association of these entities with one or more label values. Then, label-based access rules can be formalized as well. (2.) To model a dynamic protection state, these formal concepts can be mapped on the model core as discussed in Section 4.1. On top of it, the rules for changing labels of existing entities (which are also part of a system's policy) have to be modeled. (3.) Lastly, model constraints express timeinvariant side conditions for correct behavior of the AC system. Due to their static nature, such conditions are not part of the automaton's state; however, they can of course include variables referencing any system interface outside the AC system-which is of increasing importance in mobile systems (e.g. time of day, NFC device proximity, geographic location, etc.) Shebaro et al., 2014) .
In summary, we define six abstract components of an EL model, which may be specialized by the semantically appropriate components for describing a particular policy: Label Set (LS): A set containing legal label values. Relabeling Rule (RR): Rule for legal label changes.
Formally, it is usually expressed by a graph. Entity Set (ES): A set containing identifiers of existing entities in the system. Label Assignment (LA): An associations between each entity and its label (or labels). It is usually expressed by a mapping. Access Rule (AR): Rule that describes, based on two or more labels, which operations entities with these labels are allowed to perform. It is usually expressed by a mapping or a relation. Model Constraints (MC): Constraints over the other components that must be satisfied in every model state. It is usually modeled by a logical formula. This design follows the basic idea of model component specialization, which has been adopted by the core-based modeling paradigm from object-oriented programming.
The above list already implies a suitable formal notation of these components that we will adhere to; however, the modeling pattern itself does not dictate any specific formalism (other than the extended state machine required by the model core).
For specializing these abstract model components, their semantics have to be matched to policy abstractions of a real system. In order to support model dynamics, this also includes decisions about which specialized components are modifiable during policy runtime-these should be defined within the corebased model's state-and which are not. Again, the EL design does not impose any restrictions on this.
Note that EL spans a subfamily of core-based models by adding domain-specific semantic abstractions to the calculus, which are however orthogonal to those of the core paradigm. Models in this family can be further tailored to match contemporary OS security policies. In the next section, we will show an example of this based on the SELinux security policy.
SELinux SECURITY MODEL
In this section, we will demonstrate the application of EL on the SELinux operating system. In Section 5.1, the concepts of the SELinux security policy as described in Section 3 will be formalized using the EL modeling scheme. In Section 5.2, a full core-based access control model will be defined from these components. At last, Section 5.3 proposes a specification for the SELinux-specific commands and their impact on protection state transitions and model output.
EL Components
The abstractions of system resources that are managed by the Linux operating system are completely covered by the SELinux security policy. Therefore, we could define a separate entity set for each of these abstractions (processes, files, message queues, sockets, ...). However, the policy semantics are written on a higher level of granulariy: instead of singular entities, object classes are used to distinguish between OS abstractions. Since these classes are assigned to each system entity on runtime much similar to its respective security context, we will uniformly model these information as labels. Consequently, we define the following label sets:
• C is the set of SELinux object classes
• U is the set of SELinux users as defined in the policy
• R is the set of all roles as defined in the policy
• T is the set of all types and domains as defined by the policy Moreover, a single entity set E represents all processes and other system resources (such as files, sockets, etc.). To allow label changes, an SELinux policy uses special permissions such as transition or entrypoint, whose semantics drastically differ from those of other permissions used in TE-allow-rules (cf. Section 3). To this end, we refrain from modeling these elements of the policy language as actual access rules. Instead, type-and role-transitions are modeled by two relabeling rules as follows:
• → r ⊆ R 2 is a binary relation defined as r → r r iff a role transition from r to r is allowed according to the policy's role-allow-rules
• → t ⊆ T 3 is a ternary relation defined as t et − → t t iff a type transition from t to t via an entrypoint type et is allowed according to the policy's TE-allowrules User transitions can never be allowed by an SELinux policy and are therefore not modeled. The above notation serves as a shorthand here; for model checking purposes, both relations can be interpreted as edges (weighted in case of → t ) of directed graphs.
Consequently, the remaining portion of TEallow-rules in a policy is modeled by the following access rule. The mapping allow : T × T × C → 2 P represents the combined semantics of all TE-allowrules:
allow(t 1 ,t 2 , c) ={p | an allow-rule for p with key t 1 ,t 2 , c exists in the policy} where P is the set of SELinux permissions.
As already mentioned, SELinux stores label assignments as part of its protection state rather than in the policy. Nevertheless, we need to model the following label assignments for a meaningful analysis of the model's dynamic protection state:
• cl : E → C is the class assignment, which labels each entity with its SELinux object class.
• con : E → SC is the context assignment, which labels each entity with its SELinux security context. Here, the set of security contexts SC = U × R × T represents all possible security contexts (labels) for entities under the given policy. Concluding, two further restrictions on type-and role transitions have to be taken into account: those imposed by user and role declarations. For both, we use the following model constraints:
• UR ⊆ U × R associates users with roles they are allowed to assume according to the security policy's user declaration statements • RT ⊆ R × T associates roles with types they are allowed to assume according to the security policy's role declaration statements • τ UR ::= ∀e ∈ E : con(e) = u, r,t ⇒ u, r ∈ UR ensures that no role is assumed a user is not authorized for • τ RT ::= ∀e ∈ E : con(e) = u, r,t ⇒ r,t ∈ RT ensures that no type is assumed a role is not authorized for 
EL Component Q Members EXT Members
LS - C,U, R, T RR - → r , → t ES E - LA cl, con - AR - allow, P MC - τ UR , τ RT , UR, RT
Core-based Model
The formal EL components defined above will be put into context of a core-based model now. Therefore, it has to be decided which component is part of the automaton's state (thus dynamic) and which is part of the extension vector (thus static). In case of SELinux, these components directly reflect the semantics of a policy that configures the security server, which again is static during runtime-except for E, cl and con. This results in the classification shown in Table 1 . 1 According to the basic definition of the model core (1), we define an EL model for SELinux as a tuple
Each state q ∈ Q of the model is a triple E q , cl q , con q with the semantics defined above, where we use the sets E q ⊆ E of all entities in state q, CL = {cl q |cl q : E q → C} of all state-specific class assignments, and CON = {con q |con q : E q → SC} of all state-specific context assignments. The input set Σ is defined by a set of commands Σ C (that may be SELinux system calls, but also operations on application level for different implementations) and a set of arbitrary parameter sequences Σ X = (E ∪C ∪ P ∪U ∪ R ∪ T ) * . δ and λ are defined as in definitions (2) and (3) on page 5. The extensions in EXT are defined as given in Sec. 5.1. Both δ and λ are controlled by the conditions PRE and POST, which are partially defined using the following scheme. For each element of a model-specific set of commands cmd ∈ Σ C along with its parameters vector x cmd ∈ Σ X , we write:
where φ i and ψ j are expressions that q, q and x cmd should satisfy. While the above notation is used to define PRE(cmd) and POST(cmd) of each command, these conditions constitute the global terms:
While any number of arbitrary pre-condition clauses can be used in this scheme, post-conditions require a stricter pattern due to the fact that each command definition should yield exactly one possible follow-up state: Since post-conditions describe the modifications that q should undergo with respect to q, the first three boolean clauses ensure an unambiguous definition of the entity set (ψ E ), class assignment (ψ CL ), and context assignment (ψ CON ) of q . This requirement has to be considered for each specific EL model based on its particular state members. The last clause ψ MC is mandatory, since it ensures that model constraints are satisfied in each follow-up state. In case of SELX, it is defined as ψ MC ::= q |= τ UR ∧ q |= τ RT while q 0 |= τ UR ∧ q 0 |= τ RT must also hold for every correct SELX model instance.
For brevity, we will omit any of these clauses when writing command definitions iff the respective state component in q and q is equal. ψ MC will be generally considered implicit due to its mandatory nature.
Specifying SELX Commands
As an input to the state machine that triggers state transitions and output (access decisions), commands are the interface between a formalized security policy and a formalized analysis goal. As in most complex security architectures, security-relevant commands in an SELinux system may be modeled on at least two different levels of abstraction (see Fig. 2 ): (I) at PEP level, i.e. based on the access handling logic in the SELinux security module; (II) at API level, thus covering the rich and complex semantics of all API calls. Both semantical levels may be used depending on a particular analysis scenario: If a security engineer has the goal to verify a given policy based on the behavior of the security server, she will opt for Level I (in practice, this may be relevant e.g. if an attacker model includes control flow or code manipulation in a user process' address space). On the other hand, if the focus is on OS behavior from a user space perspective-considering kernel implementation as a black box-Level II commands have to be specified, accepting the more comprehensive and detailed degree of security-relevant interaction that is capsuled in an SELinux API call. In practice, given the huge flexibility of the Linux kernel with respect to differing library wrappers, kernel features and architectures, API implementations may vary in any case-thus yielding different command specifications in the model. Moreover, complexity of the state transition function that results from command specification is another important point in question. As previous work on model analysis has shown (Harrison et al., 1976; Sandhu, 1992; Stoller et al., 2011; Amthor et al., 2013) , most approaches stand or fall with a certain degree of complexity. Thus, a clean separation of Level I and Level II commands serves two goals:
I. Keep command specifications as small and uniform as possible, even across different SELinux implementations, to support dynamic model analysis.
II. Enable flexible specification of tailored, implementation-specific model dynamics that expose a high-level interface for security analyses on application level. Since Level II commands have to partially include the semantics of Level I commands, a twostep approach for modeling dynamics in SELX seems promising: We first specify a small number of commands on Level I (Sec. 5.3.1), that are general enough to be used for every SELinux implementation. We then define a pattern for specifying commands on Level II (Sec. 5.3.2) , that leverages the previous specifications and may thus be disassembled into Level I commands.
Basic Commands
Level I commands, which we call basic commands, are access, create, remove, and relabel. They are defined as follows.
access specifies the semantics of any access decision. It does not model any state transitions and thus impacts only the automaton's output (λ). Any access by a process e to an entity e that requires permission p is defined as access(e, e , p) ::= PRE: {e, e } ⊆ E q ∧ cl q (e) = process ∧ cl q (e ) = c ∧ con q (e) = u, r,t ∧ con q (e ) = u , r ,t ∧ p ∈ allow(t,t , c ) ;
create specifies how a new entity is created in the protection system. In SELX, this entity may represent a resource such as a file, directory, or a socket, but also a process. Any creation of an entity e of class c with parent entity 3 e is defined as create(e, e , c ) ::= PRE: e ∈ E q ∧ e ∈ E \ E q ∧ c ∈ C ∧ con q (e) = u, r,t ;
Corresponding to create, remove specifies removing an entity e from the system: remove(e) ::= PRE: e ∈ E q ; POST: E q = E q \ {e} ∧ cl q = cl q E q ∧ con q = con q E q
In an EL model, assigning new permissions to entities is done through labels. For SELX, a last basic command is needed that describes relabeling processes with a new security context. In SELinux, such process transitions occur on the execution of an "entrypoint" program. Changing the security context of a process e to a role r and a type t via an entrypoint program file f is defined as relabel(e, f , r ,t ) ::= PRE: e ∈ E q ∧ cl q (e) = process ∧ con q (e) = u, r,t
Note that, from an abstract view, this collection of basic commands expresses operations fundamental to every EL model-even though their particular PRE and POST terms have been tailored to SELinux policies. This is another example for our basic assumption towards the generality of the EL model family, and how it can be leveraged to enhance the modelbased engineering idea in the OS domain.
Composed Commands
Based on the specifications of basic commands, we can now give a design pattern for such commands that model a specific system's API. For this purpose, we compose such Level II commands by using the composition operator • : Σ × Σ ∪ {ε} → Σ, which is defined as follows: • relabel(caller, exec file, post r, post t) where caller ∈ E q is the calling process, exec file ∈ E q is the program file to execute, exec dir ∈ E q is the directory of the program file, post r is the role that should be assumed by caller after execution, and post t is the type that should be assumed by caller after execution.
Note that using composed commands, access control semantics of different granularity can be modeled: since basic commands cover all relevant behavior of the security policy, they can be composed on API level (outlined above), but as well on bare syscall level or even on level of a particular middleware interface.
MODEL INSTANTIATION
The goal of this section is to demonstrate how to extract model components from a real-world SELinux system. Note that this is only one of two possible model analysis use cases in practice: the other one focuses on designing an SELinux-based AC system from scratch, including API design and the policy itself. The practical process however can be considered symmetrical to the one outlined in the following.
As discussed in Sec. 4.1, there are generally three specialized definitions required to tailor a core-based model to a particular AC system: the automaton's state space (Q), model extensions (EXT), and model dynamics (δ and λ). In the following, we present our methods to perform each of these three steps in practice. We used a Linux 3.19 kernel in a Debian distribution with SELinux enabled; for most of the following steps, tools of our model engineering workbench WorSE (Amthor et al., 2014) have been used.
State Space
A protection state in SELX consists of an entity set and label assignments. Entities in SELinux are processes, whose labels are stored in the attr namespace of the /proc file system, and files representing OS objects, whose labels are stored in extended file system attributes.
Consequently, a protection state can be extracted from an SELinux system by parsing the whole file system. In practice, we build on our previous work described in Amthor et al. (2011) and Amthor et al. (2014, p. 49 ): a file system crawler, originally intended for extracting ACLs from inodes, was slightly modified to recursively scan through a file system and extract each inode number i along with its associated file type ft and the associated SELinux security context sec using stat. These information are then compiled to form the initial state of the model, where i ∈ E q 0 , cl q 0 (i) = ft, con q 0 (i) = sec. 4 For processes, the directories /proc/pid/attr are scanned with a similar result.
Further information about more technical questions such as snapshot consistency can be found in the aforementioned papers.
Model Extensions
The static model extensions in SELX consist of authorization and relabeling rules, which are equivalent to particular rule types in the SELinux security policy, and label sets these rules are based on. Model constraints regarding user-/role-/type-compatibility correspond to another type of policy rules.
To extract model extensions, we have modified the policy compiler sepol2hru from Amthor et al. (2011) . It parses policy source files in plain syntax, i.e. after expanding auxiliary m4-macros, and produces an XML-based specification for the components of EXT. For evaluation purposes, we have applied it on a basic, non-MLS configuration of the reference policy by Tresys Technology (PeBenito et al., 2006) .
The modified compiler is designed to isomorphically map statements in the SELinux policy language to definitions of the EXT components as follows:
Elements of C, P,U, R and T are explicitly declared through the statements class, common, user, role, and type.
allow is defined by assembling all TE-allowstatements as described in Sec. 5.1. We do not take into account the neverallow rule of the policy language, since it acts similar to an assertion tested by the policy compiler, but not reflected in any way in the resulting binary policy that steers the security server.
UR and RT are defined by assembling all userand role-statements as described in Sec. 5.1. → r is defined by assembling all role-allowstatements. For each parsed rule i > 0 of the form allow { r 0 . . . r n } { r 0 . . . r m }, → r is extended iteratively as follows:
• → 0 r = / 0 • → i+1 r = → i r ∪{r 0 . . . r n } × {r 0 . . . r m } The result is → r = → n r , where n denotes the total number of parsed role transition rules.
→ t is defined by assembling all TE-allowstatements for one of the three permissions transition, entrypoint, and execute no trans (we investigated their respective semantics in Sec. 3.2). Depending on which permission p is assigned to a key t 1 ,t 2 , c by a parsed rule i > 0,
